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DEADLINE FOR ACHIEVING BPT UPHELD

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977: Dead-

line for industrial dischargers in achieving best practicable control
technology cannot be waived by the courts. Section 309 of the 1977

Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act which permits the granting of an extension under certain circumstances provides the only avenue of relief from the mandatory July 1, 1977
deadline. Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228 (1978).

In July 1972, Republic Steel Corp. (Republic) applied to the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a permit which would
authorize it to continue discharging effluents from its Canton, Ohio
steel mill into Nimishillon Creek.' In June 1974, the Ohio EPA
issued a permit to Republic. The permit, in essence, would have
sanctioned Republic's discharge of effluents in excess of the federal
effluents standards beyond the July 1, 1977 deadline set by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 2 Under
§ 301 (b)(l)(A)(i) of the FWPCA, industrial dischargers were required
to comply by July 1, 1977 with various effluent limitations for point
sources 3 by the use of the application of the best practicable control
technology (BPT) current available.
The Federal office of the EPA for Region V4 objected to the
granting of this permit. In response, Republic filed a petition with
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for judicial review of the Federal
EPA's objection.' On June 23, 1977, only days before the July 1st
deadline, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Republic I, that
the Federal EPA had no authority to object to the permit which the
Ohio EPA had issued to Republic.6
1. Federal regulations provide for grants to the states to conduct research, demonstrations, and training to further the objectives of the EPA. This aid, in the form of federal
grants, establishes state EPAs. These state EPAs are responsible to the EPA Regional Administrators for their region and to the Federal EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 30 (1977).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(l)(A)(i) (1976).
3. Point source refers to any building, structure, facility or installation from which there
is or may be the discharge of pollutants.
4. The EPA is organized into ten regional offices each consisting of three to eight states.
Each regional office is headed by a Regional Administrator who is responsible directly to
the Federal EPA. Regional Administrators are responsible, inter alia, for the furtherance of
EPA objectives within their boundaries. 40 C.F.R. § 1.5, 1.41 (1977).
5. Republic Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d 91 (1977).

6. Id. at 97.
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The Sixth Circuit based its ruling on the fact that the FWPCA
expressly conditions adherence to the July 1, 1977 deadline upon a
definition by the Administrator of the EPA (Administrator) of the
BPT for the various discharging industries. Failure by the Administrator to satisfy this condition precedent by not publishing the final
regulations for alloy and steel manufacturing BPT, excused Republic's noncompliance with the July 1, 1977 deadline. After this
ruling, the EPA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court. 7
Congress, in the meantime, had enacted the Clean Water Act of
1977 (1977 Amendments), 8 which amended and revised portions of
the FWPCA. In the light of these new regulations, the Supreme Court
granted the EPA's petition for certiorari, vacated the Sixth Circuit's
ruling, and remanded the case for further consideration.9
In August 1978, in Republic II, the Sixth Circuit held that the
deadline for attaining BPT by industrial dischargers cannot be waived
by the courts.' 0 In its ruling, the court stated that the provisions of
the 1977 Amendments made their previous decision moot. The 1977
Amendments did not change the July 1, 1977 deadline for achieving
BPT, the court found, nor did it alter the requirement that the
Administrator set guidelines for BPT by October 18, 1973.
Section 309 of the 1977 Amendments' 1 provides that the Administrator cannot grant an extension to a discharger who has not
complied with the requirements of the FWPCA. But before doing so
the Administrator must find: 1) that the discharger is making a good
faith effort to comply with the FWPCA requirements and 2) that the
discharger has made a commitment of the necessary resources to
achieve compliance by the earliest possible date after July 1,
1977-although this compliance cannot occur later than April 1,
1979. This section further requires that any such extension not result
in any imposition of additional controls on any other point or
nonpoint source, that an application for the permit be filed prior to
Dec. 31, 1974, and that the facilities necessary for compliance are
under construction.
The Sixth Circuit stated, in Republic H, that Congress intended the
procedure outlined in section 309, to be the only relief possible from
7. Republic Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated, 98 S.Ct. 761
(1978).
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
§1319,91 Stat. 1566 (amending 33 U.S.C.A. 1251 (1977 Supp. 1978)).
9. Republic Steel Corp. v. Train, 557 F.2d at 97.
10. Republic Steel v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1232 (1978).
11. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
§1319(a)(5)(B), 91 Stat. 1566 (amending 33 U.S.C.A. §1251 (1977 Supp. 1978)).
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the mandatory July 1, 1977 deadline.1 2 This deadline cannot be
waived by the courts. After citing the Senate Report which dealt
with the purpose of the 1977 Amendments, 1 3 the court stated that
section 309 responds to the legitimate concerns of the dischargers
who, despite good faith efforts, have not been able to comply with
the 1977 requirements.
The Senate Committee that issued this report had also considered
the alternative of providing a case by case extension of the deadline.
In rejecting this method, the Senate Committee had stated that this
procedure would not only burden the EPA administration, but that
it would provide further opportunity for delay for those who are
otherwise unable to make a legitimate case for additional time. 14
In Republic II, Republic argued that the 1977 Amendments to the
FWPCA did not change the operation of the FWPCA as it was construed in Republic I. In other words, Republic requested the court to
affirm its decision in Republic I despite the addition of section 309
to the FWPCA. To this the court answered that it was bound to read
section 309 of the 1977 Amendments together with the original
provisions of the FPWCA "as part of an integrated whole."' I To
adhere to its earlier decision, would not only render the 1977
Amendments meaningless, but would also defeat congressional
intent. Although the Administrator can "extend the deadline where
noncompliance is caused solely by the lack of BPT guidelines," 1 6 an
extension apparently cannot be granted unless the applicant also
meets the requirements of section 309.
Given that the 1977 Amendments were, in effect, a realization on
the part of Congress that its program for improving the quality of the
nation's waters as expressed in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 was overly optimistic, the Sixth Circuit's decision in this
case can only be applauded. Section 309 of the 1977 Amendments is
a compromise between the goal of eliminating water pollution and
not unduly punishing those dischargers who are in good faith attempting to meet this goal. The court's strict construction of this
section is clearly an indication that those dischargers who are attempting to avoid their responsibilities by creating further delays will
not be indulged.
JUAN J. BACA
12. Republic Steelv. Costle, 581 F.2d at 1231.
13. S. Rep. No. 95-370 95th Cong. 1st Sess. reprinted in (1977) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4326, 4385, 4387.
14. S. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. reprinted in (1977) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4326, 4385, 4387.
15. Republic Steel v. Costle, 581 F.2d at 1232.
16. Id. at 1232.

